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Abstract
Budget feasible mechanism design studies procurement combinatorial auctions in which the sellers
have private costs to produce items, and the buyer (auctioneer) aims to maximize a social valuation
function on subsets of items, under the budget constraint on the total payment. One of the most
important questions in the field is “which valuation domains admit truthful budget feasible mech-
anisms with ‘small’ approximations (compared to the social optimum)?” Singer [35] showed that
additive and submodular functions have a constant approximation mechanism. Recently, Dobzinski,
Papadimitriou, and Singer [20] gave an O(log2 n) approximation mechanism for subadditive func-
tions; further, they remarked that: “A fundamental question is whether, regardless of computational
constraints, a constant-factor budget feasible mechanism exists for subadditive functions.”
In this paper, we address this question from two viewpoints: prior-free worst case analysis and
Bayesian analysis, which are two standard approaches from computer science and economics, respec-
tively.
• For the prior-free framework, we use a linear program (LP) that describes the fractional cover
of the valuation function; the LP is also connected to the concept of approximate core in coop-
erative game theory. We provide a mechanism for subadditive functions whose approximation
is O(I), via the worst case integrality gap I of this LP. This implies an O(log n)-approximation
for subadditive valuations, O(1)-approximation for XOS valuations, as well as for valuations
having a constant integrality gap. XOS valuations are an important class of functions and lie
between the submodular and the subadditive classes of valuations. We further give another
polynomial time O( lognlog log n ) sub-logarithmic approximation mechanism for subadditive func-
tions.
Both of our mechanisms improve the best known approximation ratio O(log2 n).
• For the Bayesian framework, we provide a constant approximation mechanism for all subad-
ditive functions, using the above prior-free mechanism for XOS valuations as a subroutine.
Our mechanism allows correlations in the distribution of private information and is universally
truthful.
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1 Introduction
Consider a procurement combinatorial auction problem where there is a buyer who wants to purchase
resources from a set of agents A. Each i ∈ A is able to supply a resource at an incurred cost c(i).
The buyer has a sharp budget B that gives an upper bound on the compensation that is distributed
among agents, and a function v(·) describing the valuation that the buyer obtains for each subset of
A. This defines a natural optimization problem: find a subset S ⊆ A that maximizes v(S) subject to∑
i∈S c(i) ≤ B. The budgeted optimization problem has been considered in a variety of domains with
respect to different valuation functions, e.g., additive (a.k.a. knapsack), and submodular [37].
Agents, as self-interested entities, may want to get as many subsidies as possible. In particular, an
agent can hide his true incurred cost c(i) (which is known only to himself) and claim ‘any’ amount b(i)
instead. We adopt the approach of mechanism design to manage self-interested, but strategic, behaviors
of the agents: Given submitted bids b(i) from all agents, a mechanism decides a winning set S ⊆ A and
a payment p(i) to each winner i ∈ S. A mechanism is called truthful (a.k.a. incentive compatible) if for
every agent it is a dominant strategy to bid his true cost1, i.e., b(i) = c(i). Truthfulness is one of the
central solution concepts in mechanism design. It ensures that every participant will behave truthfully
to his best interest.
Our mechanism design problem has an important and practical ingredient: the budget, i.e., the
total payment of a mechanism should be upper bounded by B. The budget constraint introduces a new
dimension to mechanism design and restricts the space of truthful mechanisms. For example, in single-
parameter domains where the private information of every individual is a single value (which is the case
in our model), a monotone allocation rule with associated threshold payments provides a sufficient and
necessary condition for truthfulness [31]. However, it may not necessarily generate a budget feasible
solution. Thus, a number of well known truthful designs (e.g., the seminal VCG mechanism [38, 16, 24])
do not apply, and new ideas have to be developed.
Another significant challenge due to the budget constraint is that, unlike the VCG mechanism which
always generates a socially optimal solution, we cannot hope to have a solution that is both socially
optimal and budget feasible even if we are given unlimited computational power. Indeed, in a simple
setting like path procurement with 0 or 1 valuation [35], any budget feasible mechanism may have an
arbitrarily bad solution. Therefore, the question that one may ask is “under which valuation domains
do there exist truthful budget feasible mechanisms that admit ‘small’ approximations (compared to the
socially optimal solution)?”
The answer to this question crucially depends on the properties and classifications of the valuation
function under consideration. In particular, given the following function hierarchy [29]:
additive ⊂ gross substitutes ⊂ submodular ⊂ XOS ⊂ subadditive,
which one admits a positive answer? Singer [35] initiated the study of approximate budget feasible
mechanism design and gave constant approximation mechanisms for additive and submodular functions.
In subsequent work, Dobzinski, Papadimitriou, and Singer [20] considered subadditive functions and
showed an O(log2 n) approximation. Further, it was remarked in [20] that:
“A fundamental question is whether, regardless of computational constraints, a constant-
factor budget feasible mechanism exists for subadditive functions.”
— Dobzinski, Papadimitriou, Singer
1The focus of our work is to consider strategic behaviors of the agents rather than the buyer. We thus assume
that the information related to the buyer, i.e., budget B and valuation function v(·), is public knowledge.
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In the present paper we attempt to answer this question.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
We address this question from two viewpoints: prior-free worst case analysis and Bayesian analysis. The
former is the standard framework used in computer science: in our model, the private cost c(i) of every
agent is assumed to be arbitrary without any prior knowledge. All previous research on budget feasible
mechanism design, e.g. [35, 14, 20, 22] falls into this framework. The latter Bayesian analysis [31] is
a classic economic approach that assumes the private information of the agents is drawn from a given
prior-known distribution. Bayesian mechanism design has received a lot of attention in the computer
science community in recent years, see, e.g., [27, 28, 26, 7, 11, 18, 13, 25, 5, 12, 17].
Prior-free mechanism design Consider the following linear program (LP), where α(·)’s are vari-
ables.
min
∑
S⊆A
α(S) · v(S)
s.t. α(S) ≥ 0, ∀ S ⊆ A∑
S: i∈S
α(S) ≥ 1, ∀ i ∈ A
Constraints of this LP describe a fractional set cover of A, where each set S receives weight α(S)
and we require that all agents in A are covered. An important observation about this LP is that for
any monotone subadditive function v(·), the value of the optimal integral solution is precisely v(A).
The above LP has a strong connection to the core of cost sharing games (considering v(·) instead as
a cost function), which is a central notion in cooperative game theory [33]. Roughly speaking, the core
of a game is a stable cooperation among all agents to share v(A) where no subset of agents can benefit
by breaking away from the grand coalition. It is well known that the cores of many cost sharing games
are empty. This motivates the notion of α-approximate core, which requires all the agents to share
only an α-fraction of v(A). The classic Bondareva-Shapley Theorem [9, 34] says that for subadditive
functions, the largest value α for which the α-approximate core is nonempty is equal to the integrality
gap of the LP. Further, the integrality gap of the LP equals one (i.e., v(A) is also an optimal fractional
solution) if and only if the valuation function is XOS, which is also equivalent to the non-emptiness of
the core.
Given an instance of our problem with an agent set A, we may consider the above LP and its
integrality gap for every subinstance A′ ⊆ A. We denote I as the largest integrality gap among all
subinstances A′ ⊆ A. In other words, the gap I characterizes the worst case scenario between the
optimal integral and fractional solutions of the problem. We have the following result.
Theorem 1. There is a budget feasible truthful mechanism for subadditive functions with approximation
ratio O(I). In particular, for XOS functions, the mechanism has a constant approximation ratio.
Our results show an interesting connection between the budget feasible mechanism design and the
integrality gap of the above linear program, as well as the existence of an α-approximate core. Note that
the tight bound of the integrality gap is known to be Θ(log n) [19, 8]; thus, our mechanism in the worst
case has an approximation ratio of O(log n). (But for some special functions whose integrality gaps
are bounded by constants, e.g., facility location [33], our mechanism gives a constant approximation.)
Further, the mechanism may have exponential running time, though for some special XOS functions
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like matching it can be implemented in polynomial time. To remedy these issues, we further give a
polynomial time sub-logarithmic approximation mechanism. Both of our mechanisms improve the best
known approximation ratio O(log2 n) of [20].
Theorem 2. There is a polynomial time budget feasible truthful mechanism for subadditive functions
with an approximation ratio O( lognlog logn), where n is the number of agents.
Bayesian mechanism design As a standard game theoretic model for incomplete information,
Bayesian mechanism design assumes that agents’ private information (i.e., c(i) in our model) is drawn
from a known distribution. In contrast to prior-free worst case analysis, if we have prior knowledge of
the distribution, we can obtain more positive results in the form of constant approximation truthful
mechanisms. In the Bayesian setting, we are able to answer the above question posed in [20] affirma-
tively.
Theorem 3. There is a constant approximation budget feasible truthful mechanism for subadditive
functions for any distribution under a mild assumption2.
It should be noted that our result does not completely rely on Bayesian analysis in the following
aspects.
• Truthfulness. In most of the previous works in Bayesian mechanism design regarding social welfare
maximization, e.g., [26, 5, 25, 12], the considered solution concept is Bayesian truthfulness, i.e.,
truth-telling is in expectation an equilibrium strategy when other agents’ profiles are drawn from
the known distribution. Our mechanism guarantees universal truthfulness, meaning that truth-
telling is a dominant strategy of each agent for any coin flips of the mechanism and any instance of
the costs. Thus universal truthfulness is a stronger solution concept than Bayesian truthfulness.
Universal truthfulness in Bayesian mechanism design has also been used in, e.g. [11], but their
focus was on profit maximization.
• Distribution. Regarding prior knowledge of the distribution, most of the previous related works
consider independent distributions, e.g., [27, 26, 5, 25]. Our mechanism applies to general dis-
tributions that allow correlations on costs. Dependency on private information is a natural phe-
nomenon arising in practice and it has been considered for, e.g., auctions [30]. In our model where
costs are private information, correlations appear to be very common. For example, if the price
of crude oil goes up, the costs of producing the items for all agents may go up as well.
Techniques In the design of budget feasible mechanisms, the major approach used in previous
works [35, 14, 20] is based on a simple idea of adding agents one by one greedily and carefully en-
suring that the budget constraint is not violated. Our mechanisms, from a high level structural point
of view, use another simple, but powerful, approach: random sampling. We add agents into a test set T
with probability half for each agent and compute an (approximately) optimal budget feasible solution
on T . We use the agents in T only for the purpose of ‘evaluation’ and none of them will be a winner.
The computed solution on T gives a close estimate of the optimal solution for the whole set with a high
probability. We then compute a real winning set from the remaining agents using the evaluation from
T as a threshold.
2Technically, we require that the distribution has integrable marginal densities for any subset of variables (e.g.,
jointly independent distributions trivially satisfy this condition). The formal definition is referred to Section 4.
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In the Bayesian setting, random sampling is often deemed to be unnecessary, because, when we have
knowledge of the distribution, it is tempting to use a ‘prior sampling’ approach to generate random
virtual instances and based on them to compute a threshold. While this works well when the private
cost c(i) of every agent is drawn independently, interestingly (and surprisingly), it fails when costs
c(i)’s are correlated in the distribution. We therefore still use random sampling to compute a threshold
based on the sampled test set; the collected information from random sampling correctly reflects the
structure of the private costs (with a high probability) even for correlated distributions. To derive a
constant approximation budget feasible mechanism for subadditive functions, we first generate a cost
vector sampled from the known distribution and use it as a guidance for the payments to the winners.
Then we adopt our (constant approximation) mechanism for prior-free XOS functions by feeding to
this mechanism another valuation v˜(·), which we define as the solution of the above LP computed for
the various subsets of A.
Random sampling appears to be a powerful approach and has been used successfully in other
domains of mechanism design, e.g., digital goods auctions [23], secretary problem [3, 2], social welfare
maximization [19], and mechanism design without money [15]. It is intriguing to find applications of
random sampling in other mechanism design problems.
1.2 Related Work
Our work falls into the field of algorithmic mechanism design, which is a fascinating area initiated by
the seminal work of Nisan and Ronen [32]. There are many mechanism design models; see, e.g., [33],
for a survey.
As mentioned earlier, the study of approximate mechanism design with a budget constraint was
originated by Singer [35] and constant approximation mechanisms were given for additive and sub-
modular functions. The approximation ratios were later improved in [14]. Dobzinski, Papadimitriou,
and Singer [20] considered subadditive functions and showed an O(log2 n) approximation mechanism.
Ghosh and Roth [22] considered a budget feasible mechanism design model for selling privacy where
there are externalities for each agent’s cost. All these models considered prior-free worst case analysis.
For Bayesian mechanism design, Hartline and Lucier [26] first proposed a Bayesian reduction in
single-parameter settings that converts any approximation algorithm to a Bayesian truthful mechanism
that approximately preserves social welfare. The blackbox reduction results were later improved to
multi-parameter settings in [5] and [25] independently. Chawla et al. [12] considered budget-constrained
agents and gave Bayesian truthful mechanisms in various settings. A number of other Bayesian mecha-
nism design works considered profit maximization, e.g., [27, 7, 13, 18, 11, 17]. Ours is the first to
consider Bayesian analysis in budget feasible mechanisms with a focus on the valuation (social welfare)
maximization.
2 Preliminaries
In a marketplace, there are n agents (or items), denoted by A. Each agent i ∈ A has a privately known
incurred cost c(i) ≥ 0. We denote by c = (c(i))i∈A the cost vector of the agents. For any given subset
S ⊆ A of agents, there is a publicly known valuation v(S), meaning the social welfare derived from S.
We assume that v(∅) = 0 and the valuation function is monotone, i.e., v(S) ≤ v(T ) for any S ⊂ T ⊆ A.
A centralized authority wants to pick a subset of agents with maximum possible valuation given a sharp
budget B to cover their incurred costs, i.e., max
S⊆A
v(S) given c(S) =
∑
i∈S c(i) ≤ B. We denote the
optimal solution of this optimization question by opt(A) (or opt(c)) and its valuation by v(opt(A)).
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We will consider XOS and subadditive functions in the paper; both are rather general classes
and contain a number of well studied functions as special cases, e.g., additive, gross substitutes, and
submodular.
• Subadditive (a.k.a. complement free): v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ) for any S, T ⊆ A.
• XOS (a.k.a. fractionally subadditive): there is a set of linear functions f1, . . . , fm such that
v(S) = max
{
f1(S), f2(S), . . . , fm(S)
}
for any S ⊆ A. Note that the number of functions m can be exponential in n = |A|.
An equivalent definition [21] is v(S) ≤
∑
T⊆A x(T ) · v(T ) whenever
∑
T⊆A: i∈T x(T ) ≥ 1 for any
i ∈ S, where 0 ≤ x(T ) ≤ 1. That is, if every element in S is fractionally covered, then the sum of
the values of all subsets weighted by the corresponding fractions is at least as large as v(S).
Note that the representation of a valuation function usually requires exponential size in n. Thus, we
assume that we are given an access to a demand oracle, which, for any given price vector p(1), . . . , p(n),
returns us a subset T ∈ argmax
S⊆A
(
v(S) −
∑
i∈S p(i)
)
; every such query is assumed to take unit time.
The demand oracle is used in [20] as well, and it was shown that a weaker value query oracle is not
sufficient [35].
Agents, as self-interested entities, have their own objective as well; each agent i may not tell his true
privately known cost c(i), but, instead, submit a bid b(i) strategically. We use mechanism design and
its solution concept truthfulness to manage strategic behaviors of the agents. Upon receiving b(i) from
each agent, a mechanism decides an allocation S ⊆ A of the winners and a payment p(i) to each i ∈ A.
We assume that the mechanism has no positive transfer (i.e., p(i) = 0 if i /∈ S) and is individually
rational (i.e., p(i) ≥ b(i) if i ∈ S).
In a mechanism, agents bid strategically to maximize their utilities, which is p(i) − c(i) if i is a
winner and 0 otherwise. We say a mechanism is truthful if it is of the best interest for each agent to
report his true cost, i.e., b(i) = c(i). For randomized mechanisms, we consider universal truthfulness
in this paper: a randomized mechanism is called universally truthful if it takes a distribution over
deterministic truthful mechanisms.
Note that our model is in a single parameter domain, as each agent has only one private parameter
which is his cost. Thus, by the well known characterization of single parameter truthful mechanisms [31],
designing a monotone allocation, plus the corresponding threshold payment rule, is sufficient to derive
a truthful mechanism. We therefore do not specify the payments to the winners in our mechanisms
explicitly.
A mechanism is said to be budget feasible if its total payment is within the budget constraint, i.e.,∑
i p(i) ≤ B. Our goal in the present paper is to design truthful and budget feasible mechanisms for
XOS and subadditive functions in two frameworks: prior-free and Bayesian.
We first establish the following technical lemma, which is useful in the analysis of our mechanisms.
Lemma 2.1. Consider any subadditive function v(·). For any given subset S ⊆ A and a positive
integer k, we assume that v(S) ≥ k · v(i) for any i ∈ S. Further, suppose that S is divided uniformly at
random into two groups T1 and T2. Then, with probability of at least
1
2 , we have v(T1) ≥
k−1
4k v(S) and
v(T2) ≥
k−1
4k v(S).
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3 Prior-Free Mechanism Design
In this section we consider designing budget feasible mechanisms for XOS and subadditive functions
in the prior-free setting. That is, the mechanism designer has no prior knowledge of the private
information c(i) of every agent, which can be an arbitrary cost, and the performance of a designed
mechanism is analyzed in the worst case framework. That is, we evaluate a mechanism according to
its approximation ratio, which is defined as maxc
v(opt(c))
M(c) , where M(c) is the (expected) value of a
mechanism M on instance c = (c(i))i∈A and v(opt(c)) is its optimal value. (We assume without loss
of generality that c(i) ≤ B for any i ∈ A, since such an agent will never win in any budget feasible
truthful mechanism.)
3.1 Constant Approximation for XOS
We will first consider XOS functions. Given an XOS function v(·), by its definition, we assume that
v(S) = max {f1(S), f2(S), . . . , fm(S)}
for any S ⊆ A, where each fj(·) is a nonnegative additive function, i.e., fj(S) =
∑
i∈S fj(i).
In our mechanism, we use a random mechanism Additive-mechanism for additive valuation func-
tions as an auxiliary procedure, where Additive-mechanism is a universally truthful mechanism and
has an approximation factor of at most 3 (see, e.g., Theorem B.2, [14]).
XOS-random-sample
1. Pick each item independently at random with probability 12 into group T.
2. Compute an optimal solution opt(T ) for items in T given budget B.
3. Set a threshold t = v(opt(T ))8B .
4. Consider items in A \ T and find a set S∗ ∈ argmax
S⊆A\T
{
v(S)− t · c(S)
}
.
5. Find an additive function f with f(S∗) = v(S∗) in the XOS representation of v(·).
6. Run Additive-mechanism for function f(·) with respect to set S∗ and budget B.
7. Output the result of Additive-mechanism.
In the above mechanism, we first sample in expectation half items to form a testing group T ,
and compute an optimal solution for T given budget constraint B. By Lemma 2.1, we know that
v(opt(A)) ≥ v(opt(T )) ≥ k−14k v(opt(A)) and v(opt(A \ T )) ≥
k−1
4k v(opt(A)) with a probability of at
least 12 . That is, we are able to learn the rough value of the optimal solution by random sampling, and
still keep a nearly optimal solution formed with the remaining items. We then use the information from
random sampling to compute a proper threshold t for the rest of items. Specifically, we find a subset
S∗ ⊆ A \ T with the largest difference between its value and cost, multiplied by the threshold t (in the
computation of S∗, if there are multiple choices, we break ties by any given fixed order). Finally, we use
the property of XOS functions to find a linear representation of v(S∗) and run a truthful mechanism
for linear functions with respect to S∗.
The mechanism is designated for XOS functions; it is also used crucially as an auxiliary procedure
for the more general subadditive functions in the subsequent sections. Note that the runtime of the
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mechanism for general XOS functions is exponential3.
Note that in Step (4), the function v(S)−t·c(S) that we maximize is simply the Lagrangian function
v(S)− x · c(S) + x ·B
(note that x ·B is a fixed constant) of the original optimization problem max
S
v(S) subject to c(S) ≤ B.
While we do not know the actual value of the variable x in the Lagrangian, a carefully chosen parameter
t in the sampling step with a high probability ensures that max
S
{
v(S)− t ·c(S)+ t ·B
}
gives a constant
approximation of the optimum max
S
{
v(S)− x · c(S) + x ·B
}
of the Lagrangian, which is precisely the
targeted value v(opt(A)).
The linearity of the Lagrangian, together with the subadditivity of the valuations, is important
in order to derive the following properties. (The threshold t, subset S∗, and additive function f are
defined in the XOS-random-sample.)
Claim 3.1. For any S ⊆ S∗, f(S)− t · c(S) ≥ 0.
Proof. Suppose by a contradiction that there exists a subset S ⊆ S∗ such that f(S) − t · c(S) < 0.
Let S′ = S∗ \ S. Since f is an additive function, we have c(S′) + c(S) = c(S∗) and f(S′) + f(S) =
f(S′ ∪ S) = f(S∗) = v(S∗). Thus,
v(S′)− t · c(S′) ≥ f(S′)− t · c(S′)
= v(S∗)− t · c(S∗)−
(
f(S)− t · c(S)
)
> v(S∗)− t · c(S∗),
which contradicts the definition of S∗.
The following claim says that any item in S∗ cannot manipulate the selection of the set S∗ if bidding
a smaller cost. This fact is critical for the monotonicity, and thus, the truthfulness of the mechanism.
Claim 3.2. If any item j ∈ S∗ reports a smaller cost b(j) < c(j), then set S∗ remains the same.
Proof. Let b be the bid vector where j reports b(j) and others remain unchanged. First we notice that
for any set S with j ∈ S,
(
v(S)− t · b(S)
)
−
(
v(S)− t · c(S)
)
= t
(
c(j) − b(j)
)
is a fixed positive value.
Hence,
v(S∗)− t · b(S∗) = v(S∗)− t · c(S∗) + t
(
c(j) − b(j)
)
≥ v(S)− t · c(S) + t
(
c(j) − b(j)
)
= v(S)− t · b(S).
Further, for any set S with j /∈ S, we have
v(S∗)− t · b(S∗) > v(S∗)− t · c(S∗)
≥ v(S)− t · c(S)
= v(S)− t · b(S).
3In fact, in the second step of the mechanism, we can use any constant approximation solution (e.g., algorithm
SA-alg-max established in Section 3.3), which suffices for our purpose. Further, Step (4) can be done by simply
asking a demand query. Hence, the mechanism can be implemented in polynomial time, if we have access to an
oracle that, for any subset X of items, gives a linear function f with f(X) = v(X) and f(S) ≤ v(S) for each
S ⊆ X . For some classic XOS problems like matching (the value of a subset of edges is the size of the largest
matching induced by them), our mechanism can be implemented in polynomial time.
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Therefore, we conclude that S∗ = argmax
S⊆A\T
(
v(S) − t · b(S)
)
; and by the fixed tie-breaking rule, S∗ is
selected as well.
Our main mechanism for XOS functions is simply a uniform distribution of the mechanism XOS-
random-sample and one that always picks an item from argmaxi v(i).
XOS-mechanism-main
• With half probability, run XOS-random-sample.
• With half probability, pick a most-valuable item as the only winner and pay him B.
Theorem 3.1. The mechanism XOS-mechanism-main is budget feasible and truthful, and provides a
constant approximation ratio for XOS valuation functions.
In the remaining of this section, we will prove the theorem. It follows from the following three
lemmas.
Lemma 3.1. XOS-mechanism-main is universally truthful.
Our mechanism, at a high level point of view, has a similar flavor to the mechanism composition
introduced in [1]. In particular, we may consider Steps (1-4) as one mechanism of choosing candidate
winners and Steps (5-7) as the other restricted on the survived agents; then the whole mechanism is
a composition of the two. It was shown in [1] that if the first mechanism is composable (i.e., truthful
plus the property that any winner cannot manipulate the winner set without losing) and the second
one is truthful, then the composite mechanism is truthful. In our mechanism XOS-mechanism-main,
composability of Steps (1-4) follows from Claim 3.2 and truthfulness of Steps (5-7) is by the property
of Additive-mechanism. Therefore, the mechanism is truthful.
Lemma 3.2. XOS-mechanism-main is budget feasible.
In the mechanism XOS-random-sample, the payment to each winner is the maximum amount
that the agent can bid and still win. This amount is the minimum of the threshold bids in each of
the intermediate steps (e.g., Step (4) and (6)). In particular, the payment is upper bounded by the
threshold of the mechanism Additive-mechanism in Step (6). As Additive-mechanism is budget
feasible [14], our mechanism XOS-random-sample is budget feasible as well. Finally, picking the
largest item and paying it the whole budget are clearly a budget feasible mechanism.
Lemma 3.3. XOS-mechanism-main has a constant approximation ratio.
Proof. Let opt = opt(A) denote the optimal winning set given budget B, and let k = mini∈opt
v(opt)
v(i) .
Thus v(opt) ≥ k · v(i) for each i ∈ opt. By Lemma 2.1, we have v(opt ∩ T ) ≥ k−14k v(opt) with a
probability of at least 12 . Thus, we have v(opt(T )) ≥ v(opt ∩ T ) ≥
k−1
4k v(opt) with a probability of at
least 12 (the first inequality is because opt∩T is a particular solution and opt(T ) is an optimal solution
for set T with the budget constraint).
We let opt∗ = optf (S
∗) be the optimal solution with respect to the item set S∗, additive value-
function f and budget B. In the following we show that f(opt∗) is a good approximation of the actual
social optimum v(opt). Consider the following two cases:
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• c(S∗) > B. With such assumption, we can always find a subset S′ ⊆ S∗, such that B2 ≤ c(S
′) ≤ B.
By Claim 3.1, we know f(S′) ≥ t · c(S′) ≥ v(opt(T ))8B ·
B
2 ≥
v(opt(T ))
16 . Then by the fact that
opt∗ is an optimal solution and S′ is a particular solution with budget constraint B, we have
f(opt∗) ≥ f(S′) ≥ v(opt(T ))16 ≥
k−1
64k v(opt) with a probability of at least
1
2 .
• c(S∗) ≤ B. Then opt∗ = S∗. Let S′ = opt\T ; thus, c(S′) ≤ c(opt) ≤ B. By Lemma 2.1, we have
v(S′) ≥ k−14k v(opt) with a probability of at least
1
2 . Recall that S
∗ = argmaxS⊆A\T (v(S)−t·c(S)).
Then with a probability of at least 12 , we have
f(opt∗) = f(S∗) = v(S∗)
≥ v(S∗)− t · c(S∗)
≥ v(S′)− t · c(S′)
≥
k − 1
4k
v(opt)−
v(opt(T ))
8B
· B
≥
k − 1
4k
v(opt)−
v(opt)
8
=
k − 2
8k
v(opt).
In either case, we get
f(opt∗) ≥ min
{
k − 1
64k
v(opt),
k − 2
8k
v(opt)
}
≥
k − 2
64k
v(opt)
with a probability of at least 12 . At the end we output the result of Additive-mechanism(f, S
∗, B) in
the last step of XOS-random-sample. We recall that Additive-mechanism has an approximation
factor of at most 3 with respect to the optimal solution f(opt∗). Thus the solution given by XOS-
random-sample is at least 13 · f(opt
∗) ≥ 13 ·
1
2 ·
k−2
64k v(opt) =
k−2
384kv(opt).
On the other hand, since k = mini∈opt
v(opt)
v(i) , the solution given by picking the largest item sat-
isfies maxi v(i) ≥
1
kv(opt). Combining the two mechanisms together, our main mechanism XOS-
mechanism-main has a performance of at least(
1
2
·
k − 2
384k
+
1
2
·
1
k
)
v(opt) =
k + 382
768k
v(opt) ≥
1
768
v(opt).
This completes the proof of the lemma.
3.2 Integrality-Gap Approximations for Subadditive
Next we use our result for XOS functions to design a truthful mechanism for subadditive functions. Let
S1, . . . , SN be a permutation of all possible subsets of A, where N = |2
A| is the size of the power set
2A. We consider the following linear program for each subset S ⊆ A, where each subset Sj is associated
with a variable αj .
LP (S) : min
N∑
j=1
αj · v(Sj) (♦)
s.t. αj ≥ 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ N∑
j: i∈Sj
αj ≥ 1, ∀ i ∈ S
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In the above linear program, the minimum is taken over all possible non-negative values of α =
(α1, . . . , αN ). If we consider each αj as the fraction of the cover by subset Sj, the last constraint
implies that all items in S are fractionally covered. Hence, LP(S) describes a linear program for
the set cover of S. For any subadditive function v(·), it can be seen that the value of the op-
timal integral solution to the above LP(S) is always v(S). Indeed, one has S ⊆
⋃
j: αj≥1
Sj and∑
j αj · v(Sj) ≥
∑
j: αj≥1
v(Sj) ≥ v
(⋃
j: αj≥1
Sj
)
≥ v(S).
Let v˜(S) be the value of the optimal fractional solution of LP(S), and I(S) = v(S)v˜(S) be the integrality
gap of LP(S). Let I = maxS⊆A I(S); the integrality gap I gives a worst case upper bound on the
integrality gap of all subsets. Hence, we have v(S)I ≤ v˜(S) ≤ v(S) for any S ⊆ A. The classic Bondareva-
Shapley Theorem [9, 34] says that the integrality gap I(S) is one (i.e., v(S) is also an optimal fractional
solution to the LP) if and only if v(·) is an XOS function.
Lemma 3.4. v˜(·) is an XOS function.
Proof. For any subset S ⊆ A, consider any non-negative vector γ = (γ1, . . . , γN ) ≥ 0 that satisfies∑
j: i∈Sj γj ≥ 1 for any i ∈ S. Then, we have
N∑
j=1
γj · v˜(Sj) =
N∑
j=1
γj · min
βj,·≥0
(
N∑
k=1
βj,k · v(Sk)
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀ i ∈ Sj , ∑
k: i∈Sk
βj,k ≥ 1
)
= min
β≥0
 N∑
j=1
γj
N∑
k=1
βj,k · v(Sk)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∀ j, ∀ i ∈ Sj,
∑
k: i∈Sk
βj,k ≥ 1

= min
β≥0
 N∑
k=1
( N∑
j=1
γjβj,k
)
· v(Sk)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∀ j, ∀ i ∈ Sj ,
∑
k: i∈Sk
βj,k ≥ 1

≥ min
α≥0
(
N∑
k=1
αk · v(Sk)
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀ i ∈ S, ∑
k: i∈Sk
αk ≥ 1
)
= v˜(S)
The inequality above follows from the fact that for any i ∈ S,∑
k: i∈Sk
∑
j
γjβj,k =
∑
j
γj
∑
k: i∈Sk
βj,k ≥
∑
j
γj ≥
∑
j: i∈Sj
γj ≥ 1.
Hence, v˜(·) is fractionally subadditive, which is equivalent to XOS.
We are now ready to present our mechanism for subadditive functions.
SA-mechanism-main
1. For each subset S ⊆ A, compute v˜(S).
2. Run XOS-mechanism-main for the instance with respect to the XOS function v˜(·).
3. Output the result of XOS-mechanism-main.
Theorem 3.2. The mechanism SA-mechanism-main is budget feasible and truthful, and provides an
approximation ratio of O(I) for subadditive functions, where I is the largest integrality gap of LP(S)
for all S ⊆ A.
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Proof. Note that the valuation v(·) is public knowledge and utilities of agents do not depend on v(·);
thus computing v˜(·) and runningXOS-mechanism-main with respect to v˜(·) do not affect truthfulness.
The claim then follows from Theorem 3.1 and the fact that v(S)I ≤ v˜(S) ≤ v(S) for any S ⊆ A (i.e., by
using v˜(·) instead of v(·) we lose at most factor of I in the approximation ratio).
In general, the approximation ratio of the mechanism can be as large as Θ(log n) [19, 8]. But for
those instances when the integrality gap of (♦) is bounded by a constant (e.g., facility location [33]),
our mechanism gives a constant approximation.
3.3 Sub-Logarithmic Approximations for Subadditive
In this section, we give another mechanism for subadditive functions based on the ideas of random
sampling and cost sharing. In contrast to the previous section, the mechanism runs in polynomial time
and has an o(log n) approximation ratio, improving the previously best known ratio O(log2 n) [20]. Our
mechanism relies on a constant factor approximation algorithm for subadditive function maximization
under a knapsack constraint, which may have its own interest.
3.3.1 Subadditive Maximization with Budget
We first give an algorithm that approximates max
S⊆A
v(S) given that c(S) ≤ B. That is, we ignore for
a while strategic behaviors of the agents and consider a pure optimization problem. Dobzinski et al. [20]
considered the same question and gave a 4-approximation algorithm for the unweighted case (i.e., the
restriction is on the size of a selected subset). Our algorithm extends their result to the weighted case
and runs in polynomial time if we are given a demand oracle4.
SA-alg-max
• Let v∗ = maxi∈A v(i) and V = {v∗, 2v∗, . . . , nv∗}
• For each v ∈ V
– Set p(i) = v2B · c(i) for each i ∈ A, and find T ∈ argmax
S⊆A
(
v(S)−
∑
i∈S p(i)
)
.
– Let Sv = ∅.
– If v(T ) < v2, then continue to next v.
– Else, in decreasing order of c(i) put items from T into Sv while preserving
the budget constraint.
• Output: Sv with the largest value v(Sv) for all v ∈ V.
Lemma 3.5. SA-alg-max is an 8-approximation algorithm for subadditive maximization given a
demand oracle.
Proof. Let S∗ be an optimal solution. Note that v(S∗) ≥ v∗ = maxi∈A v(i) and c(S
∗) ≤ B. For all
v ≤ v(S∗), we first prove that the algorithm will generate a non-empty set Sv with v(Sv) ≥
v
4 . Since T
is the maximum set returned by the oracle, we have
v(T )−
v
2B
c(T ) ≥ v(S∗)−
v
2B
c(S∗) ≥ v −
v
2B
·B ≥
v
2
4Independent to our work, Badanidiyuru et al. [4] gave a 2+ ǫ approximation algorithm to the same weighted
problem.
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Hence, v(T ) ≥ v2 . If c(T ) ≤ B, then Sv = T and we are done. Otherwise, by the greedy procedure
of picking items from T to Sv, we are guaranteed that c(Sv) ≥
B
2 . Assume for contradiction that
v(Sv) <
v
4 . Then
v(T \ Sv)−
v
2B
c(T \ Sv) ≥ v(T )− v(Sv)−
v
2B
(
c(T )− c(Sv)
)
> v(T )−
v
4
−
v
2B
c(T ) +
v
2B
·
B
2
= v(T )−
v
2B
c(T )
The later contradicts to the definition of T , since T \ Sv is then better than T . Thus, we always
have v(Sv) ≥
v
4 for each v ≤ v(S
∗). Since the algorithm tries all possible v ∈ V (including one with
v(S∗)
2 < v ≤ v(S
∗)) and outputs the largest v(Sv), the output is guaranteed to be within a factor of 8
to the optimal value v(S∗).
Note that we can actually modify the algorithm to get a (4 + ǫ)-approximation with running time
polynomial in n and 1ǫ . To do so one may simply replace V by a larger set
{
ǫv∗, 2ǫv∗, . . . , ⌈nǫ ⌉ǫv
∗
}
.
Both algorithms suffice for our purpose; for the rest of the paper, for simplicity we will use the 8-
approximation algorithm to avoid the extra parameter ǫ in the description.
We will use SA-alg-max as a subroutine to build a mechanism SA-random-sample for subad-
ditive functions in the next subsection. When there are different sets maximizing v(S) −
∑
i∈S p(i),
we require that the demand query oracle always returns a fixed set T . This property is important
for the truthfulness of our mechanism. To implement this, we set a fixed order on all the items
i1 ≺ i2 ≺ · · · ≺ in. We first compute
T1 ∈ argmax
S⊆A
(
v(S)−
∑
i∈S
p(i)
)
and T2 ∈ argmax
S⊆A\{i1}
(
v(S)−
∑
i∈S
p(i)
)
.
If v(T1) −
∑
i∈T1
p(i) = v(T2) −
∑
i∈T2
p(i), we know that there is a subset without i1 that gives us
the maximum; thus, we ignore i1 for further consideration. If v(T1)−
∑
i∈T1
p(i) > v(T2)−
∑
i∈T2
p(i),
we know that i1 should be in any optimal solution; hence, we keep i1 and proceed with the process
iteratively for i2, i3, . . . , in. This process clearly gives a fixed outcome that maximizes v(S)−
∑
i∈S p(i).
3.3.2 Mechanism
Let us first consider the following mechanism based on random sampling and cost sharing.
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SA-random-sample
1. Pick each item independently at random with a probability of 12 into group T.
2. Run SA-alg-max for items in group T, and let v be the value of the returned
subset.
3. For k = 1 to |A \ T |
• Run SA-alg-max on the set
{
i ∈ A \ T | c(i) ≤ B
k
}
where each item has cost B
k
,
denote the output by X.
• If v(X) ≥ log logn80 log n · v
– Output X as the winning set and pay B
k
to each item in X.
– Halt.
4. Output ∅.
In the above mechanism, we again first sample in expectation half of the items to form a testing
group T , and then use SA-alg-max to compute an approximate solution for the items in T given the
budget constraint B. As can be seen in the analysis of the mechanism, the computed value v is in
expectation within a constant factor of the optimal value of the whole set A. That is, we are able to
learn the rough value of the optimal solution by random sampling. Next we consider the remaining
items A \ T and try to find a subset X with a relatively big value in which every item is willing to
“share” the budget B at a fixed share Bk . (This part of our mechanism can be viewed as a reversion
of the classic cost sharing mechanism.) Finally, we use the information v from random sampling as a
benchmark to determine whether X should be a winning set or not.
The final mechanism for subadditive functions is described as follows.
SA-mechanism-main-2
• With half probability, run SA-random-sample.
• With half probability, pick a most-valuable item as the only winner and pay him B.
Theorem 3.3. SA-mechanism-main-2 runs in polynomial time given a demand oracle and is a truth-
ful budget feasible mechanism for subadditive functions with an approximation ratio of O( lognlog logn).
The proof of the Theorem 3.3 is given in the appendix.
4 Bayesian Mechanism Design
In this section, we study budget feasible mechanisms for subadditive functions from a standard eco-
nomics viewpoint, where the costs of all agents (c(i))i∈A are drawn from a prior known distribution D.
More specifically, the mechanism designer and all participants know D in advance from which the real
cost vector (c(i))i∈A is drawn. However, each c(i) is the private information of agent i. Distribution
D is given on the probability space Ω with the corresponding density function ρ(·) on R|A|. We allow
dependencies on the agents’ costs in D and consider the distributions that have integrable marginal
densities for any subset of variables5; this includes, e.g., independent distributions as special cases.
5We need some mild technical restriction on D in order to sample a conditioned random variable. We assume
that the density function ρ(·) of D is integrable over each subset S ⊆ A of its variables for any choice of the rest
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Every agent submits a bid b(i) as before and seeks to maximize his own utility. We again con-
sider universally truthful mechanisms, i.e., for every coin flips of the mechanism and each cost vec-
tor, truth-telling is a dominant strategy for every agent. The performance of a mechanism M is
measured by E[M] = Ec∼D[M(c)]. We compare a mechanism with the optimal expected value
E[opt] = Ec∼D
[
v(opt(c))
]
; we say mechanism M is a (Bayesian) α-approximation if E[opt]
E[M] ≤ α.
In this section: Let optv(c, S) denote the winning set in an optimal solution when the valuation
function is v(·), the cost vector is c, and the agent set is S (the parameters are omitted if they are clear
from the context); let v(optv(c, S)) denote the value of optv(c, S).
Our mechanism is as follows.
SA-Bayesian-mechanism
• With a probability of 12, let a most-valuable item be the only winner and pay him B.
• With a probability of 12, run the following:
1. Pick each item independently at random with a probability of 12 into group T.
2. Compute an optimal solution opt(c, T ) for items in T given budget B.
3. Set a threshold t = v(opt(c,T ))8B .
4. For items in A \ T find a set S∗ ∈ argmax
S⊆A\T
{
v(S)− t · c(S)
}
.
5. Sample a cost vector d ∼ D conditioned on
(a) d(i) = c(i) for each i ∈ T, and
(b) S∗ ∈ argmax
S⊆A\T
{
v(S)− t · d(S)
}
.
6. If d(S∗) < B, let all i ∈ S∗ with c(i) ≤ d(i) be the winners.
7. If d(S∗) ≥ B,
– run XOS-mechanism-main w.r.t. valuation v˜(·), set S∗, cost c(·), budget B.
– Output the result of XOS-mechanism-main.
In the mechanism, Steps (1-3) are the same as XOS-random-sample where we randomly sample
a test group T and generate a threshold value t. In Steps (4-7), we consider a specific subset S∗ ⊆ A\T
and select winners only inside of it. Step (5) helps to give us a guidance on the threshold payments of
the winners (see more discussions below). Step (7) runs XOS-mechanism-main on the function v˜(·)
(defined as the optimal value of the LP (♦)), which is XOS according to Lemma 3.4.
A few remarks about the mechanism are in order.
• It is tempting to remove the random sampling part, as given D one may consider a ‘prior sampling’
approach: Generate some virtual instances according to D and compute a threshold t based on
them; then apply this threshold to all agents in A. Interestingly, the prior sampling approach
works well in our mechanism when, e.g., all c(i)’s are independent, but it does not work for the
case when variables are dependent.
For instance, consider an additive valuation v(·) with v(S) = |S|, budget B = 2k for a large k,
and a set of N = 2k agents with the following discrete distribution over costs (c = ℓ means that
parameters, i.e., ρ(cA\S) =
∫
Ω
ρ(c) dxS is bounded. This condition is reminiscent of integrability of marginal
density functions (see, e.g., page 331 of [36]), though in our case we require a slightly stronger condition.
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every c(i) = ℓ):
Pr[c = 1] =
1
2k+1
,Pr[c = 2] =
1
2k
, . . . . . . ,Pr
[
c = 2k
]
=
1
2
,Pr
[
c = 2k+1
]
=
1
2k+1
.
Note that
v(opt(c = 1)) = 2k, v(opt(c = 2)) = 2k−1, . . . . . . , v
(
opt
(
c = 2k
))
= 1, v
(
opt
(
c = 2k+1
))
= 0.
Then the expected optimal value is E[opt] = k+12 and it is equally spread over all possible costs
except the last one c = 2k+1. Roughly speaking, on a given instance c, any prior estimate on
v(opt(c)) that gives a constant approximation only applies to a constant number of distinct costs
(the contribution of these cases to E[opt] is negligible). Hence for almost all other possible
costs, we get a meaningless estimate for opt(c). Therefore, the prior sampling will lead to a bad
approximation ratio.
• Why do we generate another cost vector d in Step (5)? Recall that our target winner set is S∗,
whose value v(S∗) in expectation gives a constant approximation of E[opt]. However, we are faced
with the problems of selecting a winning set in S∗ with a sufficiently large value and distributing
the budget among the winners. These two problems together are closely related to cooperative
game theory and the notion of approximate core. For subadditive functions, a constant approxi-
mate core may not exist [33] (e.g., set cover gives a logarithmic lower bound [8]). Thus we might
not be able to pick a winning set with a constant approximation and set threshold payments in
accordance with the valuation function. The question then is: Is there any other guidance we can
take to bound budget feasible threshold payments and give a constant approximation?
Our solution is to use another random vector d to serve as such a guidance. (Conditions in
Steps (5a) and (5b), from a high level point of view, guarantee that the vector d is not too ‘far’
from c for the agents in S∗, in the sense that both vectors are derived from the same distribution.
Thus, cost vectors c and d are distributed symmetrically and can be switched while preserving
some important parameters such as t and S∗ in expectation.) If d(S∗) ≤ B (Step (6)), then we set
d(i) as an upper bound on the payment of each agent i ∈ S∗; this guarantees that we are always
within the budget constraint. If d(S∗) > B, setting d(i) as an upper bound is not sufficient to
ensure budget feasibility; then we adopt our approach for XOS functions with inputs subset S∗
and XOS valuation v˜(·) defined by (♦).
Theorem 4.1. SA-Bayesian-mechanism is a universally truthful budget feasible mechanism for sub-
additive functions and gives in expectation a constant approximation.
Budget feasibility follows simply from the description of the mechanism and the fact that XOS-
mechanism-main is budget feasible.
For universal truthfulness, we note that in the mechanism, the sampled vector d comes from a
distribution that depends on actual bid vector c. To see why our mechanism takes a distribution
over deterministic truthful mechanisms, we can describe all possible samples d for (i) all possible cost
vectors on T and (ii) all possible choices S ⊆ A\T of S∗; then we tell all flipped d’s to the agents before
looking at the costs of T . (Practically, we can provide all our randomness as a black box accessible by
all agents.) Note that the selection rule of S∗ is monotone, and, similarly to Claim 3.2, each agent in S∗
cannot manipulate (i) the composition of S∗ given c and T , and (ii) the choice of d, as long as he stays
in S∗. Therefore, composing the first part choosing S∗ (Step (4)) with the next monotone rule picking
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winners in S∗ (Steps (6-7)), we again get a monotone winner selection rule. Hence, the mechanism is
universally truthful.
Next we give a sketch of the idea of proving the constant approximation. Details of the proof are
deferred to the Appendix B.
Approximation analysis (sketch). We sketch the proof idea of the approximation ratio of the mechanism.
First, similar to our analysis in Section 3.1, the optimal solution v(opt(c, T )) obtained from random
sampling in expectation gives a constant approximation to the optimal solution E[opt]. Further, we
observe the following facts (which are reminiscent of Claim 3.1):
v˜(S)− t · c(S) ≥ 0 and v˜(S)− t · d(S) ≥ 0, ∀S ⊆ S∗
where the second inequality is based on the conditional distribution we choose for d.
If c(S∗) ≥ B and d(S∗) ≥ B (i.e., the mechanism runs Step (7)), we can pick a subset S0 ⊆ S∗
with B ≥ c(S0) ≥ B2 . By Theorem 3.1, XOS-mechanism-main gives a constant approximation to
the optimum of v˜(·) on S∗. (This is the reason why in Step (7) of the mechanism, we run the whole
XOS-mechanism-main on the input instance v˜(·) and S∗.) Hence,
v˜(optv˜(c, S
∗)) ≥ v˜(S0) ≥ t · c(S0) ≥ t ·
B
2
≥
v(opt(c, T ))
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,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that S0 ⊆ S∗ is a budget feasible set. Thus, the optimum
of v˜(·) on S∗ is within a constant factor of v(opt(c, T )), as well as the benchmark E[opt].
If c(S∗) < B and d(S∗) ≥ B, we have v˜(S∗) ≥ t · d(S∗) ≥ v(opt(c,T ))8 . Further, we notice that
S∗ is budget feasible with respect to cost vector c; thus, XOS-mechanism-main gives a constant
approximation to v˜(S∗), which in turn is within a constant factor of v(opt(c, T )) and E[opt].
We observe that the vectors d and c are restricted to the agents in S∗ and conditioned on
S∗ ∈ argmax
S⊆A\T
{
v(S)− t · d(S)
}
and S∗ ∈ argmax
S⊆A\T
{
v(S)− t · c(S)
}
have exactly the same distributions. Therefore, due to such a symmetry between d and c, in a run of
our mechanism in expectation we will have the outcome T, t, S∗ and a pair of vectors (c, d) as often as
the outcome T, t, S∗ and the pair (d, c). This implies that in the case when d(S∗) < B and c(S∗) < B,
we get on average a value of at least 12v(S
∗), since (i) the winning sets on the two instances where c
(resp., d) is the private cost and d (resp., c) is the sampled cost altogether cover S∗, and (ii) v is a
subadditive function. By the choice of threshold t, we also know that
v(S∗) ≥ v(S∗)− t · c(S∗)
≥ v(opt(c,A \ T ))− t · c(opt(c,A \ T ))
≥ v(opt(c,A \ T ))− t · B.
Thus, our mechanism gives a constant approximation to v(opt(c)) with some constant probability.
The last case is when c(S∗) ≥ B and d(S∗) < B. Again due to the symmetry between c and d,
intuitively, we can treat this case as the above one when c and d are switched; thus we also get a
constant approximation of E[opt]. (The formal argument, however, due to multiple randomness used
in the mechanism, is much more complicated.)
Therefore, the mechanism SA-Bayesian-mechanism on average has a constant approximation of
the expected socially optimal value E[opt]. 
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5 Conclusions
Our work considers budget feasible mechanism design in two analysis frameworks: prior-free and Baye-
sian. For XOS functions, we give a prior-free constant approximation mechanism. For subadditive
functions, we present two prior-free mechanisms with integrality-gap and sub-logarithmic approxima-
tions, respectively, as well as a Bayesian constant approximation mechanism. All our mechanisms are
universally truthful.
Our mechanisms continue to work for the extension when the valuation functions are non-monotone,
i.e., v(S) is not necessarily less than v(T ) for any S ⊂ T ⊆ A. For instance, the cut function studied
in [20] is non-monotone. For such functions, we can define vˆ(S) = max
T⊆S
v(T ) for any S ⊆ A. It
is easy to see that vˆ(·) can be computed easily given a demand oracle, is monotone, and inherits the
classification of v(·). Further, any solution maximizing v(·) is also an optimal solution of vˆ(·). Hence,
we can apply our mechanisms to vˆ(·) directly and obtain the same approximations.
We give a constant approximation mechanism for subadditive functions in the Bayesian framework
where the costs are drawn from a given known distribution. Considering the gap between Bayesian
and prior-free, a natural question is under which frameworks a constant approximation mechanism still
exists. An interesting step along this direction is the prior-independent setting, where the costs are still
drawn from an underlying distribution, but the mechanism designer does not have the prior knowledge
of it. Our mechanism SA-Bayesian-mechanism can be adopted to the framework where all the costs
are identically and independently distributed. (Specifically, by random sampling we are able to learn
the underlying unknown distribution with sufficient precision.) However, we do not know how to handle
independent but not necessarily identical distributions in the prior-independent framework, as well as
the most general prior-free setting in the worst-case analysis.
Indeed, whether subadditive functions admit a prior-free constant approximation mechanism still
remains an open problem. Our results show a separation between XOS and subadditive functions.
Another angle to have such a distinction between the two classes is from exponential concentration: In
the case of XOS the valuation of a randomly selected subset obeys an exponential concentration around
its expected value6, whereas in the case of general subadditive valuations it does not (see [39] for a
counterexample). Such a difference on exponential concentration may suggest a possible distinction be-
tween XOS and subadditive functions in terms of their approximability in (budget feasible) mechanism
design (see appendix C for more details).
For those mechanisms with exponential runtime, it is natural to ask if there are truthful designs with
the same approximations that can be implemented in polynomial time. Further, all of our mechanisms
are randomized; it is intriguing to consider the approximability of deterministic mechanisms. We leave
these questions as future work.
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A Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof. Let S = A \ T . It is obvious that the mechanism runs in polynomial time since SA-alg-max is
in polynomial time. If the mechanism picks the largest item, certainly it is budget feasible as the total
payment is precisely B. If it chooses SA-random-sample, either no item is a winner or X is selected
as the winning set. Note that |X| ≤ k and each item in X gets a payment of Bk . It is therefore budget
feasible as well.
(Truthfulness.) Truthfulness for picking the largest item is obvious (as the outcome is irrelevant to
the submitted bids). Next we will prove that SA-random-sample is truthful as well. The random
sampling step does not depend on the bids of the items, and items in T have no incentive to lie as they
cannot win anyway. Hence, it suffices to only consider items in S. Observe that every agent will be a
candidate to the winning set only if c(i) ≤ Bk . Consider any item i ∈ S and fixed bids of other items.
There are the following three possibilities if i reports his true cost c(i).
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• Item i wins with a payment Bk . Then we have c(i) ≤
B
k and his utility is
B
k − c(i) ≥ 0. If i reports
a bid which is still less than or equal to Bk , the output and all the payments do not change. If i
reports a bid which is larger than Bk , he still could not win for a share larger than
B
k and will not
be considered for all smaller shares. Therefore, he derives 0 utility. Thus for either case, i does
not have incentive to lie.
• Item i loses and payment to each winner is Bk ≥ c(i). In this case, if i reduces or increases his
bid, he cannot change the output of the mechanism. Thus i always has zero utility.
• Item i loses and payment to each winner is Bk < c(i) or the winning set is empty. In this case, if
i reduces his bid, he will not change the process of the mechanism until the payment offered by
the mechanism is less than c(i). Thus, even if i could win for some value k, the payment he gets
would be less than c(i), in which case his utility is negative. If i increases his bid, he lose and
thus derives zero utility.
Therefore, SA-random-sample is a universally truthful mechanism.
(Approximation Ratio.) It remains to estimate the approximation ratio. Let opt = opt(A) denote the
optimal solution for the whole set.
If there exists an item i ∈ A such that v(i) ≥ 12v(opt), then picking the largest item will generate
a value at least 12v(opt) and we are done. In the following, we assume that v(i) <
1
2v(opt) for
all i ∈ A. Then, by Lemma 2.1, with probability at least 12 we have v(opt(T )) ≥
1
8v(opt) and
v(opt(S)) ≥ 18v(opt). Hence, with probability at least
1
4 we have
v(opt(S)) ≥ v(opt(T )) ≥
1
8
v(opt). (1)
Therefore, it suffices to prove that the main mechanism has an approximation ratio of O( lognlog logn) given
the inequalities (1).
Since SA-alg-max is an 8 approximation of v(opt(T )), we have v ≥ 18v(opt(T )) ≥
1
64v(opt).
Clearly, if SA-random-sample outputs a non-empty set, then its value is at least log logn80 logn ·v ≥
log logn
5120 logn ·
v(opt). Hence, it remains to prove that the mechanism will always output a non-empty set given
formula (1).
Let S∗ = {1, 2, 3, . . . ,m} ⊆ S be an optimal solution of S given the budget constraint B and
c1 ≥ c2 ≥ · · · ≥ cm. We recursively divide the agents in S
∗ into different groups as follows:
• Let α1 be the largest integer such that c1 ≤
B
α1
. Put the first min{α1,m} agents into group Z1.
• Let βr = α1 + · · ·+ αr. If βr < m let αr+1 be the largest integer such that cβr+1 ≤
B
αr+1
; put the
next min{αr+1,m− βr} agents into group Zr+1.
Let us denote by x+ 1 the number of groups. Since items in S∗ are ordered by c1 ≥ c2 ≥ · · · ≥ cm,
we have αr+1 ≥ αr for any r. If there exists a set Zj such that v(Zj) ≥
log logn
10 logn · v, then the mechanism
does not output an empty set, as it could buy αj items at price
B
αj
given that SA-alg-max is an
8-approximation and the threshold we set is v(Zj) ≥
log logn
80 logn · v. Thus, we may assume that v(Zj) <
log logn
10 logn · v for each j = 1, 2, . . . , x+ 1. On the other hand, by subadditivity, we have
x+1∑
j=1
v(Zj) ≥ v(S
∗) = v(opt(S)) ≥ v(opt(T )) ≥ v.
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Putting the two inequalities together, we can conclude that (x+ 1) · log logn10 logn · v > v, which implies that
x >
5 log n
log log n
≥
5 logm
log logm
.
On the other hand, since S∗ = {1, 2, 3, . . . ,m} is a solution for S within the budget constraint, we
have that
∑m
j=1 cj ≤ B. Further, since c1 >
B
α1+1
, c
β1+1
> Bα2+1 , . . . , cβx+1 >
B
αx+1+1
, we have
B ≥
m∑
j=1
cj ≥ c1 + α1cβ1+1 + · · ·+ αxcβx+1
>
B
α1 + 1
+
α1B
α2 + 1
+ · · ·+
αxB
αx+1 + 1
.
Hence,
1 ≥
1
α1 + 1
+
α1
α2 + 1
+ · · · +
αx
αx+1 + 1
≥
1
2α1
+
α1
2α2
+ · · ·+
αx
2αx+1
.
In particular, we get
2 ≥
1
α1
+
α1
α2
+ · · · +
αx−1
αx
≥ x
x
√
1
α1
α1
α2
· · ·
αx−1
αx
,
where the last inequality is simply the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means. Hence, we get
2 ≥ x
x
√
1
αx
, which is equivalent to αx ≥ (
x
2 )
x. Now plugging in the fact that m ≥ αx and x ≥
5 logm
log logm ,
we come to a contradiction. This concludes the proof.
B Analysis of SA-Bayesian-mechanism
In this section, we will give a formal proof for the constant approximation of SA-Bayesian-mechanism.
We first have the following observation.
Claim B.1. For any S ⊆ S∗, v˜(S)− t · c(S) ≥ 0.
Proof. Indeed, recall that S∗ = argmax
S⊆A\T
{
v(S)− t · c(S)
}
. Then v(S)− t · c(S) ≥ 0 for any S ⊆ S∗, since
otherwise, we have v(S) − t · c(S) < 0 for some S ⊆ S∗ and we get
v(S∗ \ S)− t · c(S∗ \ S) ≥ v(S∗)− v(S)− t · c(S∗ \ S)
= v(S∗)− t · c(S∗)−
(
v(S)− t · c(S)
)
> v(S∗)− t · c(S∗),
a contradiction.
Thus, for any S ⊆ S∗, v(S) ≥ t · c(S). Therefore, in the description of LP (S), we have v(Sj) ≥
t · c(Sj) for each j ∈ [1, N ]. Now substituting v(Sj) for c(Sj) in LP (S), we get the desired inequality
v˜(S) = LP (S) ≥ t · c(S).
We assume that no single item can have cost more than B in the cost vector c. We need some extra
notations. We assume that the distribution D is given on the probability space Ω with corresponding
density function ρ(x) on R|A|. For a set T ⊆ A, let x
T
be a point in R|T |. We will denote by
ρ(x
T
) a distribution’s density we get on the corresponding space R|T | by sampling x ∈ R|A| from D and
restricting it to T -coordinates of x. By ρ(x|x
T
) we denote the conditional density, if we fix T -coordinates
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of x to be the same as in x
T
. By opt(x, S) we denote the optimal value we can get from the set S ⊆ A
on cost vector x with budget B. In order to shorten the notations sometimes we will omit x or S, in the
latter case S = A; sometimes we take the optimum over valuation v˜ instead of v, so to emphasis this we
employ notation optv˜(x, S). In the mechanism we compute set S
∗(c, T ), which depends on the sampled
set T and cost vector c. By XOS(c, S∗) we denote the value we get from XOS-mechanism-main(c, S∗)
run on the set S∗, cost vector c and XOS valuation v˜(·) that solely depends on v(·).
In the following we write explicitly the expected value of the second part of our mechanism.∫
Ω
1
2|A|
∑
T⊂A
∫
Ω
f(x, y, T )ρ
(
y
∣∣∣y = x |T ;S∗(x, T ) = S∗(y, T ) ) dyρ(x)dx, (2)
where
f(c, d, T ) =
{
XOS(c, S∗) if d(S∗) ≥ B
v(S∗ ∩ {i : c(i) ≤ d(i)}) if d(S∗) < B,
Swapping in (2) the sum and integral we get
1
2|A|
∑
T⊂A
∫
Ω
∫
Ω
f(x, y, T )ρ
(
y
∣∣∣y = x |T ;S∗(y, T ) = S∗(x, T ) ) dyρ(x)dx =
1
2|A|
∑
T⊂A
∫
Ω(T )
∫
Ω
∫
Ω
f(x, y, T )ρ
(
y
∣∣∣xT ;S∗(y, T ) = S∗(x, T )) dy ρ(x ∣∣∣xT ) dx ρ(xT )dxT =
1
2|A|
∑
T⊂A
∫
Ω(T )
∫
Ω
∑
S⊂A\T
∫
Ω
f(x, y, T )ρ
(
y
∣∣∣xT ;S∗(y, T ) = S∗(x, T )) dy

ρ
(
x
∣∣∣xT ;S∗(x, T ) = S) · Pr(S∗(x, T ) = S ∣∣∣xT ) dx ρ(xT )dxT =
1
2|A|
∑
T⊂A
∫
Ω(T )
∑
S⊂A\T
∫
Ω
∫
Ω
f(x, y, T )ρ
(
y
∣∣∣xT ;S∗(y, T ) = S) dy · ρ(x ∣∣∣xT ;S∗(x, T ) = S) dx

Pr
(
S∗(·, T ) = S
∣∣∣xT ) ρ(xT) · dxT =
1
2|A|
∑
T⊂A
∫
Ω(T )
∑
S⊂A\T
∫
Ω
∫
Ω
f(x, y, T ) + f(y, x, T )
2
ρ
(
y
∣∣∣xT ;S∗(y, T ) = S) dy
ρ
(
x
∣∣∣xT ;S∗(x, T ) = S) dx Pr(S∗(·, T ) = S ∣∣∣xT) ρ(xT ) · dxT .
To get the first equality we split the integral w.r.t. variable x into two integrals w.r.t. variables
x
T
∈ R|T | and x conditioned on x = x
T
on T ; the second equality follows from the low of total
expectation applied to the variable in the square brackets with conditioning on all possible values of
random variable {S∗(·, T )|x
T
}; to get the third equality we swap integral with the sum; to get the last
equality we have used the symmetry between x and y for the expression in square brackets. Next, the
formula (2) can be written as
∫
Ω
1
2|A|
∑
T⊂A
∫
Ω(x,T )
f(x, y, T ) + f(y, x, T )
2
ρ
(
y
∣∣∣y = x |T ;S∗(x, T ) = S∗(y, T ) ) dyρ(x)dx, (3)
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Now we estimate the value of XOS(c, S∗) in the case when d(S∗) ≥ B. Recall that v˜(S) ≤ v(S) for
any set S ⊆ A. According to the results of previous section for the XOS functions we have a constant
approximation to the optimum: XOS(c, S∗) ≥ α · v˜(optv˜(c, S
∗)), for a positive constant α. In the next
we consider two cases for c(S∗).
1. c(S∗) < B. Since one can buy the whole set S∗, we have optv˜(c, S
∗) = S∗. We have v˜(S∗) ≥
t · d(S∗) by Claim B.1 applied to the cost vector d. Hence, recalling the definition of t we get
v˜(optv˜(c, S
∗)) ≥ v(opt(c,T ))8B B =
v(opt(c,T ))
8 .
2. c(S∗) ≥ B. Since any single item in S∗ has cost less than B, we can find a set S0 ⊂ S
∗, such
that B ≥ c(S0) ≥
B
2 . We observe that v˜(optv˜(c, S
∗)) ≥ v˜(S0), as S0 is a budget feasible set for
the cost vector c. Then we have v˜(S0) ≥ t · c(S0) by Claim B.1 and v˜(optv˜(c, S
∗)) ≥ v˜(S0) ≥
tc(S0) ≥ v(opt(c,T ))16 .
Thus
f(c, d, T ) = XOS(c, S∗) ≥
α
16
v(opt(c, T )),
if d(S∗) ≥ B. By symmetry between c and d we have XOS(d, S∗) ≥ α16v(opt(d, T )), if c(S
∗) ≥ B. We
note that c coincides with d on T , and hence opt(c, T ) = opt(d, T ). Therefore,
f(d, c, T ) = XOS(d, S∗) ≥
α
16
v(opt(c, T )),
if c(S∗) ≥ B.
In the following we estimate f(c, d, T ) + f(d, c, T ).
1. If either c(S∗) ≥ B or d(S∗) ≥ B. We observe that due to the last inequalities for f(c, d, T ) and
f(d, c, T )
f(c, d, T ) + f(d, c, T ) ≥
α
16
v(opt(c, T )).
2. If c(S∗) < B and d(S∗) < B, then by subadditivity of v we get
f(c, d, T ) + f(d, c, T ) = v(S∗ ∩ {i : c(i) ≤ d(i)}) + v(S∗ ∩ {i : c(i) ≥ d(i)}) ≥ v(S∗).
Hence we can write a lower bound on f(c, d, T ) + f(d, c, T )
f(c, d, T ) + f(d, c, T ) ≥ min
(
v(S∗),
α
16
v(opt(c, T ))
)
,
which does not depend on d. We plug in this lower bound instead of f(c, d, T ) + f(d, c, T ) into the
formula (3).
∫
Ω
1
2|A|
∑
T⊂A
∫
Ω(x,T )
min
(
v(S∗), α16v(opt(x, T ))
)
2
ρ
(
y
∣∣∣y = x |T ;S∗(x, T ) = S∗(y, T ) ) dyρ(x)dx =
∫
Ω
1
2|A|
∑
T⊂A
min
(
v(S∗(x, T ))
2
,
α
32
v(opt(x, T ))
)
ρ(x)dx.
The equality holds, since y comes from probability distribution and the function under integral does
not depend on y.
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Let i∗(x) be the most valuable item in A with c(i∗) ≤ B. We can write the following lower bound
on the total valuation of SA-Bayesian-mechanism.∫
Ω
(
0.5× v(i∗(x)) + 0.5×
1
2|A|
∑
T⊂A
min
(
v(S∗(x, T ))
2
,
α
32
v(opt(x, T ))
))
ρ(x)dx.
The optimal expected value is ∫
Ω
v(opt(x))ρ(x)dx.
In the next we argue that function g(x) := v(i∗(x)) + 1
2|A|
∑
T⊂Amin
(
v(S∗(x,T ))
2 ,
α
32v(opt(x, T ))
)
approximates v(opt(x)) within a constant factor for any cost vector x.
We fix cost vector x. Let v(i∗) = 1kv(opt), for some k ≥ 1. We know that due to the Lemma 2.1
min (v(opt(A \ T ), v(opt(T ))) ≥ k−14k v(opt) at probability at least
1
2 . For each T from the larger “good”
half (i.e., for which previous inequality holds) we can write:
v(opt(T )) ≥
k − 1
4k
v(opt)
and
v(S∗) ≥ v(S∗)− t · x(S∗) ≥ v(opt(A \ T ))− t · x(opt(A \ T ))
≥
k − 1
4k
v(opt)− t ·B ≥
k − 1
4k
v(opt)−
v(opt)
8B
·B
≥
k − 2
8k
v(opt).
The second inequality holds because S∗ ∈ argmax
S⊆A\T
{
v(S) − t · x(S)
}
; the third inequality holds
because the cost of feasible solution opt(A \T ) is within the budget; in the forth inequality we plugged
in the definition of t and used the fact that v(opt) ≥ v(opt(T )).
Therefore, combining these two lower bounds for all “good” T we get
g(x) ≥
(
1
k
+
1
2
min
(
k − 2
16k
,
(k − 1)α
128k
))
v(opt(x))
≥
1
2
(
min
(
k + 14
16k
,
kα
128k
))
v(opt(x))
≥
α
256
v(opt(x)).
Hence, we have shown that the expected value of SA-Bayesian-mechanism is within a constant
factor of α512 from the expected value of the optimal solution.
C Concentration Bounds for XOS functions
In this subsection we discuss a deep, but, on the other hand, conceptually simple, discovery in prob-
ability theory [10], that has a direct application to our scenario. We recommend a short survey by
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Vondrak [39] on the various applications of concentration inequalities for self-bounding functions in
computer science.
Here we adduce one more example and possibly one more point of view on this fascinating subject.
Briefly in a simplified description the story is as follows. There is a set A of n elements and each of
them is picked independently at random into a set T ⊆ A. This set T further receives a valuation
v(T ) given by a positive monotone function v : 2A → R. We note that when v is an additive function,
elements of A naturally correspond to coins of diverse face values, which then is being tossed and tails
are taken into T . When each coin has a small nominal relative to the total expected value, we get
exponential concentration around expectation by a natural variant of the low of large numbers and
Chernoff bounds (the standard formulation of LLN and consequently Chernoff bounds is for 0-1 coins
and different probabilities of tails, whereas in our case the probabilities are all equal to 0.5 but values
may vary).
The most interesting part of the story is that one can generalize the exponential concentration to
much broader classes of valuations. For instance v may be taken to be submodular or even fractionally
subadditive. Then the concentration inequalities are as follows.
Claim C.1 ([39]). Let v(·) be positive monotone XOS function. If maxi∈A v({i}) = v0, and Z =
v(X1, . . . ,X|A|), where Xi ∈ {0, 1} are independently random, then for any δ > 0.
• Pr
[
Z ≥ (1 + δ)E[Z]
]
≤
(
eδ
(1+δ)1+δ
)E[Z]
v0 .
• Pr
[
Z ≥ (1− δ)E[Z]
]
≤ e−0.5δ
2
E[Z]/v0 .
On the other hand, if one goes slightly further and considers subadditive valuations, then exponential
concentration fails to be true (see [39] for counterexample). It is interesting to see one more sharp
distinction between subadditive and fractionally subadditive valuations in a quite different mechanism
design problem.
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